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A B S T R A C T
We provide new insights into the business lending decisions of institutional investors in online credit markets by
benchmarking their lending performance against that of retail investors.We find superior performance for loans
financed by institutional investors, although large sized retail investor groups achieve equivalent performance.
Lending decisions of institutional investors are not default risk minimising, and we quantify lending in-
efficiencies. From a platform perspective, we show that (i) the platform-administered loan allocation process is
not biased in favour of institutional investors, (ii) institutional participation in the retail marketplace is not a
distorting factor in loan performance, and (iii) the platform’s move to a fixed rate system had detrimental effects
on loan outcomes for institutional investors. The superior loan performance achieved by institutional investors is
confined to the auction period, when institutional investors had autonomy over setting interest rates.
1. Introduction
Alleviation of information asymmetries is the greatest challenge in
lending to private enterprise, and this is exacerbated in the small
business environment by the relatively high cost of compiling in-
formation on individual firms, the limited and fragmented market for
this information, and difficulties in signalling to the market (Boot,
2000; Mac An Bhaird & Lucey, 2010). Such information asymmetries
are most pronounced for start-ups (Cassar, 2004; Mac an Bhaird & Lynn,
2015), and lead to borrower discouragement from conventional inter-
mediated debt among younger, smaller and higher risk firms (Freel,
Carter, Tagg, & Mason, 2012; Kon & Storey, 2003; Mac an Bhaird,
Sanchez-Vidal, & Lucey, 2016). Firms are restricted in their access to
investment finance due to the lack of diversification in private debt
markets (Mac an Bhaird, 2010). Additionally, because of the pro-cy-
clical supply of debt finance, SMEs experience a reduction in credit
availability in the wake of banking and financial crises.
Online credit markets enable borrowers to seek funding from len-
ders on a direct peer-to-peer basis using web-based platforms, without
the traditional intermediation function provided by financial institu-
tions. The rapid embrace of peer-to-peer lending in recent years in-
dicates significant demand from firms and investors alike. Studies on
online lending markets focus on equity based or debt based channels
(e.g. Pierrakis & Collins, 2013). Equity based crowdfunding studies
examine the issue from the perspective of the firm (Hornuf &
Schwienbacher, 2017; Signori & Vismara, 2018), and the investor
(Günther, Johan, & Schweizer, 2018; Hornuf & Schwienbacher, 2018).
Debt based crowdfunding studies generally examine personal lending
(e.g. Morse, 2015; Tang, 2019). A particular focus has been the use of
hard and soft information in mitigating informational asymmetry
(Dorfleitner et al., 2016; Ge, Feng, Gu, & Zhang, 2017). In a peer-to-
business lending setting, Dorfleitner, Hornuf, and Weber (2018) ex-
amine a proposed ‘default shock bias’ effect, showing that subsequent to
suffering loan defaults investors make decisions that lead to a wor-
sening of the risk-return profile of investor portfolios.
While online lending markets were initially dominated by retail
investors, a significant emerging trend is the increasing participation of
institutional investors, including commercial and development banks,
non-bank financial institutions and asset management firms. Many
peer-to-peer lending platforms have opened up their marketplaces to
institutional investors, including the largest business lending platform
in the UK, Funding Circle, which is the basis of this study. From a
platform perspective, we investigate the channels through which in-
stitutional investors provide business lending, while, from an invest-
ment perspective, we investigate loan outcomes based on institutional
investors' appraisal of loan opportunities. Given this context, we seek to
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T
add to a growing literature on this topic (Boubaker & Nguyen, 2019), by
presenting a number of new insights into institutional investment in
online business lending markets.
Institutional investment in venture capital (e.g. Bruton & Ahlstrom,
2003; Bruton, Fried, & Manigart, 2005) and private equity (e.g. Nielsen,
2007), whether direct or indirect (via funds), is well studied. In con-
trast, not much is known of institutional investment in crowdfunding
markets. There is, however, an emerging literature addressing this
topic, and it is to this discourse that we add insights from the per-
spective of online business lending.
Vallee and Zeng (2019) show that sophisticated investors system-
atically outperform unsophisticated investors in personal lending and
this is explained by superior information processing. By contrast, Lin,
Sias, and Wei (2017) find that institutional investors do not outperform
retail investors, despite having larger and more diverse portfolios and
avoiding home bias. We differ from Vallee and Zeng (2019) and Lin
et al. (2017) in focusing on online business lending, which exposes
lenders to higher likelihood of default than personal unsecured lending
(Mach, Carter, & Slattery, 2014). Our study closely aligns with
Mohammadi and Shafi (2017), although their testing does not take
account of institutional investment in the retail marketplace on the
Funding Circle platform.
Our study differs in a number of important respects, providing a
number of contributions as follows. Firstly, we provide an important
clarification on the participation of institutional investors in an online
credit market, which requires careful consideration in the testing de-
sign. We account for two channels of institutional investor participa-
tion: the wholesale market place (wholeloans) where a single institu-
tional investor provides the full funding for a loan; and the retail market
place (partloans), consisting predominantly of retail investors, although
one particular institutional investor has invested in all retail loans over
our sample period of between 5 and 20% of the loan values. We explore
the potential distortion from this institutional participation in the retail
marketplace. In a series of tests, our results are consistent when the
analysis is repeated on sets of partloans selected to either dilute or re-
move this potential distortion. We find that wholeloans outperform
partloans, earning superior returns across likelihood of loan default and
loan rates, indicating a superior ability of institutional investors to
screen loan applications. We also find that institutional investors
achieve higher realised returns upon loan repayment. However, we find
that losses are substantially greater for wholeloans upon default.
Secondly, we consider the Funding Circle loan allocation process
and explore if there is any bias in favour of institutional investors.
Applying the Wald-Wolfowitz runs test of randomness (Wald &
Wolfowitz, 1940), we find no evidence that the loan allocation process
administered by the lending platform is non-random and biased. This
assertion holds when tested on loans across each of the credit rating
bands as assigned by the lending platform.
As a third contribution, we use a testing approach drawn from the
banking literature (Greene, 1998; Jacobson & Roszbach, 2003), which
allows us to examine lending efficiency and whether investment deci-
sions of institutional investors are default risk minimising. This ap-
proach also provides a more complete mitigation of sample selection
bias. We find no correlation between ex-ante loan granting decisions
and ex-post default outcomes. While this validates a univariate esti-
mation of default likelihood, it establishes that lending decisions of
institutional investors are not consistent with an objective of default
risk minimisation and, hence, there is a degree of lending inefficiency in
the wholesale market. Exploiting our default modelling framework, we
provide a number of new insights by examining lending efficiency
through the lens of value-at-risk (VaR), following the simulation ap-
proach of Jacobson and Roszbach (2003). We find that institutional
investors could have made more efficient lending decisions, manifesting
as reduced value-at-risk exposure. We show that this lending in-
efficiency is consistent with a naïve strategy of randomly rejecting
loans.
Fourthly, we consider the effect of investor group size in the retail
marketplace, to ascertain whether institutional investors systematically
outperform small, medium and large sized retail investor groups.
Literature suggests that group size is positively related to better out-
comes in group decision making, possibly being a proxy for group di-
versity and group experience (Bassamboo, Cui, & Moreno, 2015;
Surowiecki, 2005). Using a novel tercile-based segmentation of the
retail investor base, we find that the performance of wholeloans fi-
nanced by institutions is superior to partloans financed by small- and
medium-sized retail investor groups only, with no outperformance in
the case of partloans financed by large-sized retail investor groups. We
conclude that large-sized groups of retail investors appear to perform
equivalently to institutional investors.
Finally, we present new evidence on the performance of loans
funded by institutional investors through an important structural
change in the lending platform, whereby the determination of interest
rates changed from an auction-based system to one where interest rates
are set by the lending platform. This change in systems has important
implications for institutional investors, moving them from interest rate
setters to interest rate takers. We document the performance of
wholeloans between the two interest rate setting periods, finding that
institutional investors show outperformance only in the auction period.
The loss of autonomy from switching to the fixed rate system appears to
have been detrimental for institutional investors.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 de-
scribes the loan data and presents the technical details of our proposed
testing. We also discuss important sample selection bias issues and how
we address these within the testing framework. Section 3 provides a
comprehensive discussion of our main findings, in addition to providing
the results of the robustness checks that we conduct. Section 4 provides
our analysis of lending efficiency. In Section 5, we perform our analysis
of retail investor group size effects, while Section 6 investigates the
platform's transition from an auction-based system to a fixed rate
system of setting interest rates. Concluding remarks are made in Section
7.
2. Data and testing methodology
Our dataset consists of all loans provided through one of the largest
global online lending platforms between 2014 and 2016 inclusive.
Funding Circle facilitates lending to businesses. The platform initially
launched in the UK in 2010 and subsequently set up operations in the
US in 2013 and Germany and the Netherlands in 2015. While Funding
Circle acquired market exposure in Spain, in addition to Germany and
the Netherlands, through its acquisition of Zencap in 2015, it subse-
quently exited the Spanish market in 2016.
We focus on the UK lending market, which consists of £5.6bn in
loans advanced to 56,000 businesses worldwide between its launch in
2010 and the end of November 2018. The lending platform charges the
borrower an origination fee, and charges investors an annual servicing
fee of 1% of the outstanding principal. Most loans are unsecured, al-
though the platform facilitates secured loans, which constitutes a
smaller segment of the market. The platform has a base of over 50,000
investors, consisting mostly of individuals, along with a number of in-
stitutional investors, including the European Investment Bank, the
British Business Bank, as well as international asset management firms
such as Aegon and KLS. Institutional investors were granted a dedicated
wholesale marketplace on 6th May 2014. The wholesale market is
confined to institutional investors, although institutional investment in
the retail market is possible. Indeed, as confirmed in re with the lending
platform, one large institutional investor passively invests in the retail
market on a consistent basis, having funded between 5 and 20% of the
value of all retail loans over our sample period. The wholesale market
differs from the retail market in that for any loan financed, a single
institution provides the full funding. Such loans are designated as
‘wholeloans’. By contrast, in the retail market, loans are financed by a
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number of, predominantly, retail investors. Such loans are designated
‘partloans’.
Investment in wholeloans in the wholesale marketplace can be
made in a number of different ways. Firstly, a direct lending route,
whereby institutional investors purchase loans directly onto their own
balances sheets or through special purpose vehicles. Secondly, an in-
direct lending route, whereby institutional investors provide funds
through the Funding Circle SME Income Fund that is quoted on the
London Stock Exchange, an investment company that passively invests
in Funding Circle loans and pays dividends to investors. Thirdly, an
additional indirect lending route, whereby institutional investors pro-
vide funds through an umbrella ICAV (Irish Collective Asset
Management Vehicle) that facilitates the launch of private sub-funds of
Funding Circle loans.
Our focus is on comparing the lending performance of wholeloans
and partloans, from which we can, with the appropriate transition in
interpretation, evaluate the decision making of institutional investors.
We therefore focus on loans with observed outcomes, while we exclude
outstanding loans for which outcomes are not realised. We do this as we
consider performance jointly in respect of loan screening ability and
realised loan payoffs. Our final dataset consists of 3791 loans in total; of
which 3201 were repaid in full and 590 defaulted. Loans are assigned to
the two marketplaces in a randomised fashion; a processed adminis-
tered by the lending platform. The retail marketplace funded all 1946
loans it was initially offered. In contrast, institutional investors in the
wholesale marketplace were selective, choosing to fund only 1489 of
the 1845 loans it was offered. The 356 loans that were rejected by in-
stitutional investors were then subsequently offered to retail investors
in a recycling process automated by the lending platform. All such re-
cycled loans were funded in full in the retail marketplace.
Our key variables of interest are defined in Table I and descriptive
statistics are provided in Table II. Analysis of investments, returns and
defaults by loan type is presented in Table III. There are notable dif-
ferences between the profile and performance of loans funded in the
wholesale and retail markets, as evidenced by analysing across credit
ratings throughout the investment period. Risk preferences within both
marketplaces change over the period. Investors in the retail market-
place increasingly invest in lower risk loans, with half of their total
investments in the lowest risk (A+) loans in 2016. Investors in the
wholesale marketplace, by contrast, invest relatively less in the lowest
risk loans, between 21% and 32% over the period. Such investors also
invest relatively more in credit grade B and C loans relative to the retail
marketplace, with this differential increasing over time. In 2016, over
31% of the total investments in the wholesale marketplace were in
grade B and C loans, as opposed to<9% in the retail marketplace.
It is notable that institutional investors in the wholesale market earn
higher interest rates than investors in the retail marketplace across all
credit grades in 2014 and 2015, apart from very slight lower differences
in the highest and lowest grades in 2015 (0.02% and 0.16% respec-
tively). In 2016, this was reversed, with investors in the retail mar-
ketplace earning higher interest rates across all credit grades apart from
grade C (equal) and grade E (0.14% higher). Similar patterns are evi-
dent in the realised returns earned on repaid loans, as measured by the
internal rate of return (IRR). Wholeloans earn a higher return than
partloans when repaid in 2014 and 2015, with the exception of the
highest and lowest credit grades in 2015. In 2016 this pattern is par-
tially reversed, as investors in the wholesale market earn a slightly
lower rate on the two highest credit grades (0.20% and 0.04% re-
spectively), and credit grade D (0.11%). In respect of defaulted loans,
wholeloans experience significantly greater losses than partloans across
all credit grades in 2014. By contrast, in 2015 loans funded in the
wholesale marketplace record lower losses than loans in the retail
marketplace, across credit grades A+, C and E, losing on average
19.21%, 11.8% and 4.36% less. A discernible pattern is that the losses
on defaulted wholeloans decline over time vis-a-vis partloans, although
average losses on defaulted loans are increasing for both marketplaces.
Table I
Key variable definitions.
Variable Variable type Description
Default Binary Indicates loan default
1 = loan defaulted; 0 = loan repaid.
Term Continuous Duration of loan (in months)
log Age Continuous Natural log of the age of the borrowing firm
(date of incorporation less date of loan origination)
log LoanAmt Continuous Natural log of the loan amount
Wholeloan Binary Wholeloan investment in the wholesale marketplace
1 = wholeloan; 0 = partloan
Recycled Binary Loan rejected by institutional investor in the wholesale marketplace and recycled into the retail marketplace
1 = recycled; 0 = otherwise
IntRate Percentage Interest rate payable on the loan
Ret Percentage Ex-post return on loan
CrBandA–CrBandE Dummy Dummy variables corresponding to the credit band categories: A, B, C, D, E. The reference category is credit band A+
Sector Dummy Dummy variable representing sectors: Agriculture, Arts and Entertainment, Automotive, Consumer Services, Education and Training, Health,
Leisure, Manufacturing, Professional and Business support, IT and Telecoms, Retail, Transport, Wholesale, Property and Other. The reference
category is IT and Telecoms.
Region Dummy Dummy variables representing UK regions: South East, South West, North East, North West, East Anglia, Midlands, London, Scotland, Wales,
Northern Ireland. The reference category is London.
Purpose Dummy Dummy variables representing loan purpose: Expansion, Working Capital, Asset Finance, Property Finance, Debt Refinancing, Other
Purpose. The reference category is Property.
Table II
Variable summary statistics.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Default 3791 0.156 0.363 0 1
LoanAmt 3791 73,016.580 83,313.980 5000.00 650,000.00
log LoanAmt 3791 10.724 0.974 8.52 13.39
IntRate 3791 9.853 1.977 6.00 18.37
Term 3791 36.762 18.737 3.00 60.00
log Age 3791 2.033 0.748 0.00 4.64
Ret 3791 −2.715 30.874 −100.00 79.01
Wholeloan 3791 0.393 0.488 0 1
Recycled 3791 0.094 0.292 0 1
CrBandA+ 3791 0.249 0.433 0 1
CrBandA 3791 0.258 0.438 0 1
CrBandB 3791 0.223 0.416 0 1
CrBandC 3791 0.162 0.368 0 1
CrBandD 3791 0.093 0.291 0 1
CrBandE 3791 0.014 0.119 0 1
Variables defined in Table I.
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2.1. Testing methodology
Our study comprises, in line with existing work, an analysis of loan
screening ability, through the modelling of (i) loan rates and (ii) loan
default probability; and, in an extension of existing work, an analysis of
loan payoff, through the modelling of (iii) realised returns upon loan
repayment and (iv) realised returns upon loan default. We align our
loan performance measures with previous studies. Similar to Emekter,
Tu, Jirasakuldech, and Lu (2015) and Miller (2015), we consider
probability of loan default and the interest rate charged on approved
loans. Consistent with Berkovich (2011), we quantify the payoffs
achieved by investors through realised loan returns. We analyse de-
faulted and repaid loans separately to avoid information loss through
averaging effects in the proposed regression analysis. In analysing de-
faulted loans, we differ from Berkovich (2011) in having access to re-
covery amounts and so we avoid the need to make a zero recovery rate
assumption. This facilitates a more accurate measurement of loan
losses. For repaid loans, there are instances where loans are repaid
early, leading to differences in ex-post returns and ex-ante loan rates.
We employ the probit modelling framework to investigate potential
determinants of the probability of loan default. We use realised loan
outcomes, with a specific emphasis on the relationship between ex-ante
loan rates and ex-post loan defaults. While alternative default prob-
ability modelling techniques are possible, such as Cox proportional
hazard regression or stacked logit (DeYoung, Glennon, & Nigro, 2008),
such a survival analysis is not deemed necessary as the prediction of
default timing is not our particular concern. We seek to establish
whether institutional investors in the wholesale marketplace exploit
their professional sophistication to show strict dominance in approving
loans at higher interest rates than loans approved in the retail mar-
ketplace, while not facing a higher frequency of loan defaults. The
binary outcome of a loan default event is therefore sufficient. The probit
model is specified as follows:
= = +prob Default B( 1 | ) ( )i 0 (1)
where
Term Age LoanAmt IntRate Wholeloan Recycled
CrBandA CrBandB CrBandC CrBandD CrBandE
{ , log , log , , , ,
, , , , }
is the vector of predictors, as defined in Table I;
B { , , , , , ,
, , , , }
Term Age LoanAmt IntRate Wholeloan Rejected
CrBandA CrBandB CrBandC CrBandD CrBandE
log log
is the vector of regression coefficients; Φ() is the cumulative standard
normal distribution function; and the binary variable Defaulti = 1
designates a default on loan i.1 In including the credit band dummy
variables, we use the A+ credit rating as the reference case. Two
variables are worth particular comment. Firstly, the principal variable
of interest is the Wholeloan dummy variable, which identifies whole-
loans funded by institutional investors in the wholesale marketplace.
This variable provides insights into differences in the likelihood of
default on wholeloans relative to partloans funded in the retail
Table III
Data descriptive statistics by retail and wholesale marketplaces.
Retail marketplace Wholesale marketplace
Credit grade 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016
Percentage investment
A+ (very low risk) 31.34% 59.67% 50.53% 21.16% 31.71% 28.67%
A (low risk) 23.68% 23.88% 36.37% 27.79% 27.85% 33.12%
B (below average risk) 19.52% 7.66% 6.22% 28.32% 18.78% 17.34%
C (average risk) 17.20% 4.69% 2.68% 17.19% 13.00% 13.76%
D 8.26% 2.55% 1.90% 5.54% 7.86% 5.28%
E 0.00% 1.55% 2.30% 0.00% 0.80% 1.82%
Average default rates (as % of amount invested in credit band)
A+ (very low risk) 0.41% 3.13% 0.77% 0.96% 6.22% 1.46%
A (low risk) 4.82% 4.81% 3.73% 0.83% 8.75% 2.40%
B (below average risk) 10.86% 5.78% 1. 81% 2.54% 9.42% 2.03%
C (average risk) 14.69% 5.53% 1.29% 2.88% 14.18% 6.58%
D 13.48% 5.11% 0.97% 3.11% 18.83% 4.25%
E 28.62% 17.90% 24.98% 16.33%
Average loan rates
A+ (very low risk) 7.75% 7.87% 8.09% 8.26% 7.85% 7.94%
A (low risk) 9.03% 9.18% 9.40% 9.48% 9.26% 9.32%
B (below average risk) 10.07% 9.84% 10.44% 10.53% 10.23% 10.40%
C (average risk) 11.12% 10.99% 11.81% 11.53% 11.36% 11.81%
D 12.52% 12.92% 14.01% 12.98% 13.27% 13.95%
E 18.09% 17.79% 17.93% 17.93%
Average realised returns (IRR; defaulted loans)
A+ (very low risk) −42.54% −83.21% −99.92% −78.24% −64.00% −96.35%
A (low risk) −46.73% −76.17% −83.76% −52.83% −81.00% −80.71%
B (below average risk) −41.55% −81.35% −99.76% −57.63% −85.59% −99.31%
C (average risk) −50.86% −81.58% −99.23% −67.58% −69.78% −98.88%
D −41.61% −84.52% −90.27% −53.14% −85.57% −99.89%
E −88.91% −99.59% −84.55% −99.96%
Average realised returns (IRR; repaid loans)
A+ (very low risk) 6.96% 7.08% 7.34% 7.36% 7.04% 7.14%
A (low risk) 8.13% 8.53% 8.69% 8.71% 8.54% 8.65%
B (below average risk) 9.31% 9.10% 9.76% 9.89% 9.57% 9.82%
C (average risk) 10.30% 10.33% 11.28% 11.02% 10.86% 11.37%
D 11.99% 12.41% 13.84% 12.53% 13.01% 13.73%
E 18.46% 18.27% 18.45% 18.30%
1We suppress the i superscript on the independent variables, here and
throughout, for convenience of notation.
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marketplace. Secondly, Recycled is a dummy variable that is included to
capture whether a loan has been recycled. We discuss later the appro-
priateness of including this variable.
We include interest rate along with the credit band categories in the
probit model specification. The latter might seem redundant on the
basis that the interest rate should fully incorporate default risk (Adams,
Einav, & Levin, 2009). However, the immaturity of online lending
markets motivates us to consider the interest rate as a function of the
investor's noisy estimate of the probability of default. We therefore
include the credit bands in the probit specification on this basis. For
robustness, we extend the base probit model specification with time,
region, sector and loan purpose fixed effects. Finally, while our data-
base primarily includes unsecured loans, a total of 685 loans are se-
cured. We do not include a control variable for secured loans as the
secured loans are exclusively property-based loans. As property-based
loans are identified through our loan purpose dummy variable, in-
cluding a secured loan identifier is redundant.
To investigate the ex-ante perception of loan risk by market parti-
cipants, we use the interest rate charged on loans. We estimate our
model using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression estimation with
robust standard errors. The model is formally defined as follows:
= +
= + + +
+ + +
+


















where IntRatei represents the interest rate charged on loan i. Similar to
the probit model, the Wholeloan dummy variable in this case facilitates
an examination of differences in the interest rate charged on whole-
loans funded in the wholesale marketplace relative to partloans funded
in the retail marketplace, with the Recycled dummy variable providing
information on recycled loans. We again extend the base regression
specification to take account of potential fixed effects by including time,
region, sector and loan purpose dummy variables.
To model realised returns on loans that default/repay, we follow a
similar regression structure to the loan rate case. The model is formally
defined as follows:
= +
= + + +
+ + +
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where Reti represents the realised return on loan i. Realised returns are
estimated using internal rate of return (IRR), under the following as-
sumptions: (i) the monthly repayment on each loan is that agreed when
the loan is funded; (ii) if a loan is repaid early, the outstanding principal
is repaid on the last payment; and (iii) if a loan defaults and there are
recoveries, these are repaid in the month following default. These as-
sumptions are necessary as borrowers can decide to increase or de-
crease the monthly payment at discretion but this is unknown, while
the exact timing of recoveries is also unknown. The assumptions we
make provide a conservative estimate of the IRR.
2.2. Addressing sample selection bias
2.2.1. Initial loan application screening
One potential source of sample selection bias comes from the initial
loan application screening conducted by the lending platform, which
selects loans to be presented to the marketplaces. Three key pillars are
set out by the platform as underlying its credit assessment process: (i)
policy criteria, which set out eligibility requirements, including a
minimum of two years of trading history, at least one year of filed ac-
counts, no court judgements in the past 12 months, and UK ownership
and resident directors; (ii) statistical credit models, which are pro-
prietary and use extensive data to assess creditworthiness; and (iii)
expert judgement, which draws on the expertise of the credit assess-
ment team. While it is likely that this screening protects the platform
from ‘bad’ borrowers to some degree, Funding Circle does not make
data available on loans that are rejected at this initial screening stage
that would allow us to appraise this issue. This is, therefore, necessarily
outside the scope of our study and we focus exclusively on investor
investment decisions post this screening stage. As discussed next, the
allocation of loans by the lending platform to the wholesale and retail
marketplaces is random. There is, therefore, no reason to expect a
concentration of adverse selection in either marketplace.
2.2.2. Remarks on the randomised loan allocation process
A statistical concern in our comparison of the wholesale and retail
marketplaces is the randomness of the two loan groups being compared.
This is directly addressed through the loan allocation process ad-
ministered by the lending platform. Loans are allocated randomly by
the platform between the wholesale and retail marketplaces. This ran-
domisation eliminates sample selection bias in respect of loan group
formation and resulting endogeneity concerns. In terms of statistical
identification, we are dealing with a randomised experiment. However,
we note that sample selection bias still exists given the selectivity
shown by institutional investors in deciding to grant certain loans over
others. Such decision making is not random. We address this particular
point later in this section.
The statement that we are dealing with a randomised experiment is,
of course, only true if we believe that the process administered by the
lending platform is unbiased. It may be questioned as to whether this is
truly the case and whether the lending platform is motivated in some
way to direct higher quality loans to the wholesale marketplace. One
may suggest that this can be probed through testing whether there are
statistical differences in the characteristics of the wholeloan and
partloan books. However, as informed by the literature on randomised
control-treatment analysis in other disciplines, testing statistical dif-
ferences in baseline characteristics between the subject groups is not
appropriate in efforts to confirm the randomness of the group formation
procedure (e.g. Altman, 1985; de Boer, Waterlander, Kuijper,
Steenhuis, & Twisk, 2015; Harvey, 2018). On average, across rando-
mised experiments, randomised groups will have the same character-
istics, but if differences in characteristics do exist between groups in a
given randomised experiment then this should not necessarily raise
doubts about the randomisation procedure (Altman, 1985). On this
basis, we take a different approach and exploit the fact that we know
when each loan is accepted by the lending platform and presented to
investors, and we know in which marketplace the loan is placed. This
allows us to test whether the sequence of loan allocations to the
wholesale and retail marketplaces follows a random process. Any ob-
vious bias in this loan allocation procedure should become apparent.
We use the Wald-Wolfowitz runs test of randomness (Wald &
Wolfowitz, 1940) for this purpose.
For the implementation of the Wald-Wolfowitz runs test of ran-
domness, we code each loan allocation as either “1” if it is first placed in
the wholesale marketplace or “2” if it is first placed in the retail mar-
ketplace. We then order this sequence of loan allocations by the loan
acceptance date, i.e. the date on which each loan is accepted by the
lending platform and placed in either the wholesale marketplace or
retail marketplace. We can then test this sequence of loan allocations on
the basis of a null hypothesis that the sequence was produced in a
random manner. A normally distributed test statistic, Z, can be obtained
as follows:




where R is the observed number of runs and a “run” is defined as a
sequence of consecutive “1's” or “2's”, E(R) is the expected number of
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where n1 is the total number of “1's” (or wholeloans) and n2 is the total
number of “2's” (or partloans).
Table A.I (Panel I) in Appendix A (online) details the results. We
find no evidence that the loan allocation process administered by the
lending platform is non-random and biased. When we repeat the ana-
lysis for each of the credit bands separately (Table A.I, Panels II–VII),
we again find no evidence that the allocation process favours institu-
tional investors in terms of loan quality.
2.2.3. Inclusion of recycled loans
As established, loans are randomly allocated by the lending plat-
form between the wholesale and retail marketplaces. This is true when
loans are first presented to market. However, wholeloans that are not
financed by institutional investors are subsequently recycled and pre-
sented to the retail marketplace. The presentation of such loans is of
course non-random. Some comment is therefore required on the in-
clusion of recycled loans in our testing set out. We show that in-
corporating this non-random information in our randomised experi-
ment does not present a problem. We show later that when we repeat
the tests with recycled loans excluded, our findings are consistent. Our
motivation for including recycled loans though is that they provide
interesting insights into the investments foregone by institutional in-
vestors.
2.2.4. Institutional investor selectivity
The focus of our paper is on comparing the wholesale and retail
markets places in order to make statements on the decision making of
institutional investors. A potential source of sample selection bias
therefore comes from the selectivity shown by institutional investors in
funding loans in the wholesale marketplace, i.e. institutional investors
do not finance all loan applications. The random allocation of loans into
the wholesale marketplace does not remove sample selection bias
concerns in this respect as the decision to fund a given loan is not
random. We address this explicitly and present a statistical approach
motivated by existing literature.
We begin with a conventional bank lending setting and draw on the
literature pertaining to credit score modelling (Greene, 1998; Jacobson
& Roszbach, 2003). In the process of screening loan applications,
sample selection bias arises from the observability of loan default out-
comes only for those loans funded by the bank. Any estimation of de-
fault likelihood in isolation is therefore likely to be biased given the
non-random nature of the loan pool used in the estimation. In line with
Heckman (1979), recasting the problem as a bivariate probit selection
model, comprising a loan granting process and a loan default process
allows us to explicitly account for this source of sample selection bias
(Boyes, Hoffman, & Low, 1989). Importantly, this allows us to link the
decisions of investors to grant loans with the ultimate outcomes in re-
spect of loan default and to make inferences on whether these decisions
are consistent with an objective of default risk minimisation. Sample
selection bias, as an inherent issue of correlation between observable
and unobservable variables, manifests in this bivariate probit selection
model setting as a significant correlation between the error terms of the
two processes (Vella, 1998). This suggests that there are unobserved
factors influencing the decision to lend that are related to the un-
observed factors that are influencing the likelihood of loan default. In
this case, only the joint estimation of the two processes delivers esti-
mates that are consistent (Vella, 1998).
The likelihood of default in our setting may be influenced by the
selectivity of investors in granting certain loans over others, such that
an estimation of the univariate default probit model may be biased.
Some observations are required. Firstly, over the sample period all
loans presented to the retail marketplace are funded, and so no se-
lectivity is observed in the lending decisions of the retail investor
groups operating in this marketplace. This is not the case for institu-
tional investors operating in the wholesale marketplace, where some
loans are indeed rejected. Secondly, all rejected wholeloans are fully
funded when recycled into the retail marketplace. Therefore, in our
setting, we have full sight of all institutionally rejected loans, albeit
such loans are ultimately funded by retail investors in the retail mar-
ketplace. It could be argued therefore that this mitigates sample se-
lection bias, as we observe the outcomes of these rejected loans.
However, we argue that the subsequent funding of recycled wholeloans
in the retail marketplace is not a perfect counterfactual situation. For
instance, during the auction period of our sample (1st January
2014–27th September 2015), the interest rates bid by investors in the
retail marketplace on recycled wholeloans are likely to be different
from the interest rates that would have been bid by institutional in-
vestors had the lending requests been initially successful in the
wholesale marketplace.
It is therefore prudent for us to account for sample selection bias in a
bivariate selection-outcome system and explore to what extent there is
a relationship between the decision to grant funding for loans and
subsequent loan default events. There is also an appealing economic
interpretation to our approach in that it allows us to construct a nar-
rative pertaining to the unobserved determinants of the decision to
grant a loan. This is pertinent for our sample, as we have a limited set of
observable loan and firm characteristics, and we are unaware of the
borrower information being utilised by lenders.
We closely follow the approach taken in the credit scoring literature
(Greene, 1998; Jacobson & Roszbach, 2003; Marshall et al., 2010;
Roszbach, 2004) in structuring a bivariate selection-outcome (loan-
granting-loan-default) probit model defined in general terms as follows:












X Term Age LoanAmt IntRate Wholeloan Recycled
CrBandA CrBandE
{ , log , log , , ,
, , , }
.2
For the loan granting process, we define Granted_FirstTime = 1 if a
loan presented to the market (whether wholeloan or partloan) is
granted first time,2 which is assumed to be driven by
2 It is important to emphasise that when we say a loan has been funded first
time, we mean that the loan has been funded by the investor cohort to which it
is first presented. So a loan that is presented to the wholesale market place and
funded fully is deemed to have been granted first time (and, hence, designated
as a ‘wholeloan’ with one part). In contrast, a loan that is presented to the
wholesale market place and not funded, i.e. declined by institutional investors,
is deemed not to have been granted first time. This is not to be conflated with
the internal procedure of Funding Circle, whereby if a loan is not funded on a
first round by a given investor cohort then it is subsequently re-presented to the
same investor cohort on a second round.
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= …X Term Age LoanAmt Offered Wholeloan CrBandA
CrBandE
{ , log , log , _ , ,
, } ,
1
where Offered_Wholeloan is a dummy variable introduced to indicate if a
loan has been offered in the first instance to the wholesale marketplace.
The error terms ε1i and ε2i capture the influence of unobservable factors
driving the two processes; the former partly capturing the borrower
information used by investors to inform their decisions to grant loans,
and the latter partly capturing firm specific factors leading to default.
The two error terms are assumed to be jointly normally distributed with
correlation coefficient ρ. A statistically significant ρ establishes that
there is a relationship between the loan granting and loan default
processes, implying that the two must be estimated jointly. Estimating
default probability in a univariate probit model would therefore be
biased. In terms of economic interpretation, if the correlation is also
negative then this indicates a pattern of investors minimising default
risk.
The bivariate probit model is estimated using three approaches for
robustness. We first consider wholeloans and partloans jointly and in-
clude loans rejected by institutional investors in the wholesale market
in the default process, thus adopting identical dimensions for both the
loan granting and loan default processes. We then run a Heckman se-
lection probit model, where we exclude the rejected loans from the
default process, thereby working as if these loan outcomes are un-
observable. The default process therefore has a lower dimension than
the granting process (by the number of loans rejected). For
completeness, and to isolate the decision making of the institutional
investors in the wholesale market, we implement the Heckman selec-
tion probit model once more, on this occasion including only loans
offered to the wholesale marketplace, while continuing to exclude re-
jected loans from the default process. This latter specification only
models the lending decisions of institutional investors within the
wholesale marketplace. We therefore drop Wholeloan from the default
process and Offered_Wholeloan from the granting process.
2.3. Institutional participation in the retail marketplace
In our testing framework, we have to carefully transition from a
comparison of marketplaces (i.e. wholesale versus retail marketplaces)
to a comparison of investor cohorts (i.e. institutional versus retail in-
vestors). This is due to the fact that we have confirmed, via direct
communications with the lending platform, that there is a single large
institutional investor that has invested consistently in the retail market
on a passive basis, funding between 5 and 20% of the loan value of all
retail loans covered in our sample. This creates a potential source of
bias that may distort information from the retail marketplace, pre-
venting us from directly interpreting the information as relating purely
to retail investors. We therefore conduct a number of robustness checks
to investigate whether this institutional activity in the retail market-
place is a distorting factor.
The first approach we take is to repeat our analysis using a database
of loans that pre-appends our current sample of 2014–2016 with the
2010–2013 period, allowing us to include all years since the estab-
lishment of the platform. While the same large institutional investor
participated in the retail marketplace in 2013, only retail investors
operated in the years 2010–2012. This serves to dilute any potential
distortion of information from the retail marketplace due to institu-
tional participation. The second approach we take is to compare the
wholesale marketplace over the 2014–2016 period with the retail
marketplace over the 2010–2012 period. This serves to remove poten-
tial distortion due to institutional participation in the retail market-
place. In comparing marketplaces across different periods of time, we
account for time fixed effects. The third approach we take is similar to
this but we create on this occasion a one-to-one matched loan sample
from the retail marketplace loans over 2010–2012. The matching pro-
cedure involves exact matching on the basis of sector and loan term and
nearest neighbour matching on the basis of loan amount. This serves to
remove potential institutional investment distortion in a more con-
trolled manner than the previous approach, while we again account for
time fixed effects.
If our findings from the three approaches prove to be broadly con-
sistent with our main findings then this provides some confidence that
institutional activity is not distorting the lending information ema-
nating from the retail marketplace. After careful consideration of this
issue, we may then consider the retail marketplace and retail invest-
ment interchangeably in our discussions.
3. Empirical results and discussion
3.1. Main findings
The main results of the default probability probit models are pre-
sented in Table IV, with the main results of the loan rate and realised
returns regression models presented in Table V. We focus on the base
model specifications, making reference to the extended model specifi-
cations with time, region, sector and loan purpose fixed effects as re-
quired. There is broad consistency between the alternative model spe-
cifications. The results of the robustness checks outlined in Section 2.3,
pertaining to the presence of institutional investors in the retail mar-
ketplace, are presented in Tables B.I–B.VI in Appendix B (online). The
findings of these robustness checks are consistent with the main find-
ings we report below. We can, therefore, validly speak of the wholesale
Table IV
Probability of loan default.
Base model Ext. model
Coeff. Marginal effects Coeff. Marginal effects
Term 0.0197*** 0.0042*** 0.0191*** 0.0039***
(0.0016) (0.0003) (0.0018) (0.0004)
log Age −0.1156*** −0.0246*** −0.1985*** −0.0408***
(0.0384) (0.0082) (0.0427) (0.0087)
log LoanAmt −0.0458 −0.0097 −0.0081 −0.0017
(0.0326) (0.0069) (0.0364) (0.0075)
IntRate 0.0958*** 0.0204*** 0.1102*** 0.0226***
(0.0356) (0.0076) (0.0368) (0.0075)
Wholeloan −0.1165** −0.0248** −0.1529** −0.0314**
(0.0585) (0.0124) (0.0643) (0.0132)
Recycled 0.0848 0.0180 0.0381 0.0078
(0.0858) (0.0182) (0.0879) (0.0181)
CrBandA 0.3373*** 0.0718*** 0.2709*** 0.0557***
(0.0997) (0.0212) (0.1051) (0.0216)
CrBandB 0.3336*** 0.0710*** 0.2209* 0.0454*
(0.1207) (0.0257) (0.1262) (0.0259)
CrBandC 0.4127*** 0.0878*** 0.2949* 0.0606*
(0.1517) (0.0323) (0.1587) (0.0326)
CrBandD 0.2325 0.0495 0.0851 0.0175
(0.2098) (0.0446) (0.2180) (0.0448)
CrBandE −0.0872 −0.0186 −0.2667 −0.0548







Observations 3791 3791 3791 3791
LR chi2 355.51 471.40
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.1084 0.1437
Table reports the results of the probit regression model of loan default prob-
ability. The base probit regression model specification is as per Eq. (1) (Section
2.1), with the extended model extending the base model with time, region,
sector and purpose fixed effects. All variables are defined in Table I. Coeff.
denotes regression coefficient. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, *
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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(retail) marketplace and wholeloans (partloans) interchangeably when
referring to institutional (retail) investment. The results reported in
Appendix C (online) (Tables C.I–C.II) confirm that the presence of re-
cycled loans in our testing is not a source of bias. We find broad con-
sistency in our findings, whether recycled loans are included or ex-
cluded from the analysis.
In respect of our main findings, we begin with a discussion of loan
screening ability. We observe that the probability of loan default is
2.48% lower for wholeloans funded in the wholesale marketplace
compared to partloans funded in the retail marketplace (Table IV),
while the interest rates on wholeloans are 0.40% higher on average
(Table V). Hence, institutional investors appear to have a superior
ability to screen loans than retail investors in the retail marketplace,
achieving higher ex-ante loan rates on agreed loans while assuming
lower ex-post default risk. Our results contrast with Lin et al. (2017)
who find no evidence of a difference between institutional and retail
investment in peer-to-peer personal lending. This suggests that peer-to-
peer business lending may be different in this respect.
In respect of recycled loans, we observe that such loans bear interest
rates 0.29% higher on average (Table V) without an attendant higher
probability of default (Table IV) compared to all other loans (across
both wholesale and retail marketplaces). This seems to suggest some
missed opportunity on the part of institutional investors in the whole-
sale marketplace who appear to forego on this higher return potential.
However, when we compare the recycled loans against wholeloans
only, we make a different conclusion. We present the results of this
analysis in Appendix D (online). It can be seen that recycled loans ac-
tually have a higher probability of default than wholeloans (Table D.I),
while loans rates are actually lower than wholeloans on average (Table
D.III). So institutional investors appear to have been able to offload
loans that offer lower interest rates against higher default exposure.
This contrasts to the case of recycled loans compared against non-re-
cycled partloans. It is in this case that recycled loans bear higher in-
terest rates on average (Table D.IV) without an attendant higher
probability of default (Table D.II). So what we see in our main results is
really being driven by the relationship between recycled and non-re-
cycled partloans.
Moving beyond loan screening ability, our analysis of realised re-
turns (Table V) provides some new insights. Firstly, we show that
wholeloans funded in the wholesale marketplace achieve higher rea-
lised gains when loans are repaid, although the margin is narrow at
0.47%. By contrast, outcomes on defaulted loans in the wholesale
marketplace are considerably worse than in the retail marketplace, with
losses recorded to be 15.37% higher. We can conclude therefore that
although the likelihood of default is lower for loans funded in the
wholesale marketplace, such loans lose considerably more upon de-
fault. With regard to recycled loans, such loans appear to lose more
upon default and earn more upon repayment (Table V) when compared
to all other loans. Separating out the analysis as done in Appendix D
(online), we observe that this result is again being driven by the re-
lationship between recycled and non-recycled partloans (Table D.IV).
When the comparison is confined to just recycled loans and wholeloans,
we see instead that recycled loan lose in the case of loan default but
earn less when loans are repaid.
We have therefore presented evidence that, relative to retail in-
vestors in the retail marketplace, institutional investors in the whole-
sale marketplace make lending decisions which are, on average, asso-
ciated with lower probability of default and higher loan rates – showing
superior loan screening ability - and higher realised gains upon loan
repayment – showing superior loan payoffs when investors are repaid in
Table V
Loan rate and realised return analysis.






Base model Ext. model Base model Ext. model Base model Ext. model
Term 0.0093*** 0.0103*** −0.7235*** −0.5752*** 0.0099*** 0.0112***
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.1143) (0.1085) (0.0008) (0.0009)
log Age −0.0873*** −0.0494*** 7.7114*** 7.1346*** −0.0857*** −0.0391**
(0.0163) (0.0176) (2.2882) (2.2141) (0.0187) (0.0198)
log LoanAmt 0.2536*** 0.2160*** −1.3513 −1.6460 0.2755*** 0.2313***
(0.0129) (0.0148) (2.1723) (1.8906) (0.0154) (0.0184)
Wholeloan 0.4042*** 0.4473*** −15.3659*** −4.8149* 0.4664*** 0.5160***
(0.0259) (0.0280) (3.0511) (2.7994) (0.0292) (0.0308)
Recycled 0.2936*** 0.3105*** −6.4406* −7.8892** 0.2855*** 0.3100***
(0.0436) (0.0435) (3.7165) (3.6860) (0.0630) (0.0634)
CrBandA 1.3334*** 1.3806*** 3.7428 −0.1402 1.4060*** 1.4603***
(0.0344) (0.0354) (5.5632) (5.4909) (0.0399) (0.0435)
CrBandB 2.3154*** 2.3609*** 5.7617 −2.6572 2.4759*** 2.5329***
(0.0363) (0.0379) (5.3892) (5.2860) (0.0422) (0.0460)
CrBandC 3.4072*** 3.4638*** 6.9410 −2.9672 3.6457*** 3.7110***
(0.0398) (0.0414) (5.6679) (5.5301) (0.0466) (0.0503)
CrBandD 5.1319*** 5.1946*** 5.6841 −1.6727 5.5643*** 5.6395***
(0.0477) (0.0488) (6.1820) (5.7564) (0.0541) (0.0571)
CrBandE 10.1409*** 10.2067*** −14.3245 −3.4966 11.3467*** 11.3944***
(0.1053) (0.1055) (9.2227) (8.9707) (0.0792) (0.0869)
Constant 4.7448*** 5.3945*** −31.5165 12.6367 3.6830*** 4.4511***
(0.1493) (0.2256) (21.6970) (22.8260) (0.1797) (0.2618)
Region Yes Yes Yes
Sector Yes Yes Yes
Purpose Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3791 3791 590 590 3201 3201
Adj. R2 0.8605 0.8640 0.1433 0.3275 0.8563 0.8614
F 2342.08 603.55 9.14 9.62 3202.57 796.38
Table reports the results of the loan rate and realised returns regression models. The base regression model specifications are as per Eqs. (2) and (3) (Section 2.1)
respectively, with the extended model extending the base model with time, region, sector and purpose fixed effects. All variables are defined in Table I, along with the
base cases for the dummy variable categories used. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels
respectively.
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full. Furthermore, we are able to ascertain that institutional investors
generally make smart decisions with respect to the loans that they re-
ject, as evidenced when we confine our analysis to a comparison of
wholeloans and recycled loans. The evidence we present broadly sup-
ports the conclusion that the sophistication of institutional investors
leads to superior lending outcomes in the wholesale market. This aligns
with the conclusions of Vallee and Zeng (2019), albeit their study
concerns personal lending.
3.2. Institutional investor selectivity
We address the potential source of sample selection bias resulting
from the non-random selectivity shown by institutional investors in
their lending decisions in the wholesale marketplace. We re-consider
our loan default estimation and implement the bivariate selection-
outcome (loan-granting-loan-default) model proposed in Section 2.2.
Estimated correlation coefficients are presented in Table VI. The bi-
variate probit model confirms that the correlation between the loan
granting and loan default processes is indistinguishable from zero, and
so we conclude that this potential source of sample selection bias is not
a concern in our calculation of default probability. The Heckman se-
lection probit specification, which excludes recycled loans from the
default process, confirms this conclusion. Our univariate estimation of
the probit model as per Eq. (1) is therefore not biased, but the economic
interpretation of this is notable.
The unobservable factors driving decisions to fund loans, which in
part capture the use of borrower information in appraising loan appli-
cations, are not associated with the unobservable factors driving loan
default outcomes. This points to an inability of institutional investors in
the wholesale marketplace to manage information asymmetries in such
a way as to minimise default risk. Indeed, when we isolate the lending
decisions of institutional investors within the wholesale marketplace,
we find no link between decisions to lend and the default outcomes of
loans.
4. Lending efficiency
The last section showed that institutional investors make lending
decisions that do not reflect a practice of default risk minimisation. That
is, institutional investors are not making decisions to grant loans that
lead to lower default exposure. This is evidence of lending inefficiency.
It is therefore of interest to quantify the level of inefficiency in the
lending decisions of institutional investors. To this end, we implement
the simulation exercise of Jacobson and Roszbach (2003), which uses
value-at-risk (VaR) as a measure of lending efficiency.
We conduct a Monte Carlo simulation of the estimated probit model,
where for each simulation we calculate an expected default probability
for each loan request. We then define a default risk decision rule
whereby loan requests with an expected default probability that equal
or exceed a chosen default likelihood threshold δ are rejected, while
those below the threshold are funded. To ensure robustness, we conduct
1000 simulations in total. Repeating the exercise for a range of δ-
threshold values allows us to imply the threshold level that corresponds
to the actual level of financing provided by institutional investors. In
total, institutional investors extended £85.66 m in loans, which implies
a δ-threshold of 26.71%, which is a notably high likelihood of default
upon which to base lending decisions.3 Table E.I in Appendix E (online)
presents the loan loss distribution characteristics for the wholesale
marketplaces. The δ-threshold of 26.71% is found by a simple linear
interpolation between the adjacent total lending amounts corre-
sponding to the 25% and 30% δ-thresholds.
To quantify the level of lending inefficiency, we perform a VaR
analysis based on the simulated distribution of loan losses using a
26.71% default likelihood decision rule, following the design of
Jacobson and Roszbach (2003). We generate results at the usual 1%,
5% and 10% VaR levels, which are reported in Table VII (Panel A). To
distinguish between the sample and efficient institutional investor
lending reported, note first that in the former sample case, the VaR
estimates are calculated based on the actual loans chosen by the in-
stitutional investors in the sample. That is, for each simulation, the
portfolio is formed from the 1489 loans that institutional investors
actually funded. In the latter efficient case, for each simulation the
portfolio is formed by selecting from the full pool of wholeloans, i.e. the
same 1489 loans plus the 356 loans that were originally rejected by
institutional investors. This allows us to assess whether the institutional
investors could have made more efficient lending decisions, i.e. rejected
a different set of wholeloans to reduce VaR exposure. We see that more
efficient decision making could indeed have been made and would have
Table VI
Sample selection bias testing: Bivariate selection-outcome models.
ρ Standard error Likelihood ratio test of ρ = 0
χ2(1) p-Value
Bivariate probit model
(all loans; recycled wholeloans included in loan default process)
−0.1886 0.3533 0.35 0.5557
Heckman selection probit model
(all loans; recycled wholeloans excluded from loan default process)
0.0230 0.3017 0.01 0.9395
Heckman selection probit model
(wholeloans only; recycled wholeloans excluded from loan default process)
−0.9999 0.0000 0.78 0.3768
Table reports the results of the bivariate selection-outcome (loan-granting-loan-default) probit model, with recycled loans included in the loan default process, and
the associated Heckman selection probit models, with recycled loans excluded from the loan default process. The loan default process is defined with dependent
variable Default (=1 if loan defaults) related to the set of independent variables {Term, logAge, logLoanAmt, IntRate,Wholesale,Recycled,CrBandA,…,CrBandE}. The
loan granting process is defined with dependent variable Granted_FirstTime (=1 if loan granted first time) related to the set of independent variables
{Term, logAge, logLoanAmt,Offered_Wholeloan,CrBandA,…,CrBandE}. See Section 2.2 for further details. For comparative purposes, we also implement the Heckman
selection probit model on loans offered to the wholeloan segment of the market, excluding recycled loans from the default process. This latter specification models
the lending decisions of institutional investors only.
3 The δ range we are consider is {0.05, 0.06, 0.07, 0.08, 0.09, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2,
0.25, 0.3, 0.35, 0.4, 0.45, 0.5, 0.55, 0.6, 0.65, 0.7, 0.75, 1.00}. For each of these
threshold levels, we calculate the mean level of funding across the 1000 si-
mulations. We then use simple linear interpolation to infer the δ-threshold that
corresponds to the actual level of lending extended by institutional lenders, i.e.
£85.66 m.
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reduced the institutional investor VaR exposure by approximately
£2.5 m.
These findings may of course be an artefact of the observed outcome
of the random loan allocation process administered by the lending
platform. We therefore conduct a randomised loan allocation simula-
tion designed as follows. We randomly redefine each loan as either
wholeloan or partloan, which generates a counterfactual scenario. We
obtain a set of simulated wholeloans that differ from the set of observed
wholeloans. We then proceed to randomly reject a number of whole-
loans, in the same proportion to the observed data. This allows us to test
whether the lending inefficiency of institutional investors in the
wholeloan marketplace is consistent with or different from a naïve
strategy of randomly rejecting loans. We repeat this procedure for a
large set of simulations, whereby we generate 1000 counterfactual
scenarios of 1000 simulations each.
Table VII (Panel B) reports the results of this particular analysis,
where it can be seen that, across the alternative counterfactual loan
allocation scenarios, had institutional investors followed a default risk
based decision rule then greater efficiencies would have been achieved
relative to case of randomly rejecting loans. The magnitude of VaR
reductions is in the order of £3m, and 2% on a relative basis, which is
remarkably similar to the efficiencies reported in Table VII (Panel A).
This suggests that our main finding is not an artefact of the observed
outcome of the random loan allocation process, and further that the
observed decision making of institutional investors does not appear to
be distinct from a strategy of randomly rejecting loans.
5. Retail investor group size effects
In a unique contribution to existing work, we extend our analysis
thus far and argue for a more nuanced consideration of the retail in-
vestor base. Surowiecki (2005) identifies that the ‘wisdom of crowds’ is
premised on three important conditions: independence, diversity, and
decentralisation. These are all properties that apply in the crowd-
funding setting. A somewhat surprising conclusion of Surowiecki
(2005) is that large groups of untrained people are often better at de-
cision making than small groups of experts. Drawing on these theories,
group size and group diversity have been found to be positively related
to better outcomes in a number of non-financial applications
(Bassamboo et al., 2015). In addition, Robert and Romero (2017)
identify group experience as another important component of the
wisdom of crowds.
On the flip side, however, there is a counter view to the above logic
that must be acknowledged. Olson (1965) argues that unless a group is
small or unless there is some form of coercion or some other channel
through which to unify constituent members' objectives then even ra-
tional, self-interested individuals will not work towards the common
interests of the group. The logic game based analysis of Hardin (1982)
confirms that collective action is generally bound to fail unless the
scenario is such that collective action is not actually needed. By con-
trast, the anthropological analysis conducted by the same author sug-
gests that collective action can be effective (ineffective), even in large
(small) groups, but this is subject to a complex set of interactions.
Oliver and Marwell (1988) provide a counter argument to Olson
(1965), however, suggesting that when groups are large and diverse,
fewer contributors are needed to provide an overall contribution to the
group. In our online lending market context, an interpretation of this
idea is that a subgroup of financially experienced investors may be
sufficient in order for large groups, in aggregate, to make better fi-
nancial decisions. Oliver and Marwell (1988) explain that this re-
lationship holds on the basis of there being high jointness of supply to the
good, meaning that the cost of the good has a low dependency on the
number of participants in the group, i.e. the cost of the good does not
increase with the number of participants. This is the case for loan
funding applications, whereby the overall cost of funding the loan, i.e.
the loan amount sought by the borrower, does not vary depending on
the number of funders.
While our database does not provide information on the diversity
and experience of retail investor groups, we can readily identify group
size by means of the number of loan parts. We propose that group size is
positively related to lending outcomes, primarily through better ag-
gregation of information that exploits the diversity and experience of
constituent members. Consequently, we suggest that a large group is
more likely to have a broader, more diverse span of opinion, knowledge
and skills across its constituent members.
To investigate if there are group size effects in our setting, we repeat
our comparative analysis, segmenting the partloan book into terciles,
whereby we establish small (Low_Parts), medium (Med_Parts) and large
(High_Parts) retail investor group size identifiers. This segmentation of
the partloan book implies an upper threshold for the small group size
category as 498 parts (or individual investors) and an upper threshold
for the medium group size category as 1221 parts (or individual in-
vestors). Repositioning wholeloans as the baseline group, we adapt our
testing models to now include the Low_Parts, Med_Parts and High_Parts
dummy variables. Results are reported in Tables VIII and IX. While the
likelihood of default for loans financed by small- and medium-sized
retail investor groups is statistically significant and higher (by over 3%;
Table VIII) than that for loans financed by institutional investors in the
wholesale marketplace, this is not the case for loans financed by large-
sized retail investor groups, where there is no statistically significant
difference evidenced relative to institutional investors. So in respect of
loan default, there appears to be no difference in default risk exposure
between institutional investors and large-sized retail investor groups.
Table VII
Efficiency of wholeloan marketplace lending.












Panel A: lending efficiency: observed loan allocation
Sample 85.66 13.34 0.16 13.27 0.15 13.24 0.15
Efficient 85.66 10.77 0.13 10.68 0.12 10.62 0.12
Panel B: lending efficiency: randomised loan allocation (random loan rejection)
Sim sample 108.76 15.56 0.14 15.49 0.14 15.45 0.14
Sim efficient 108.76 12.91 0.12 12.77 0.12 12.70 0.12
Table is organised as follows. Panel A presents a comparison of the estimated
value-at-risk exposure of the sample lending in the wholeloan marketplace and
the efficient lending in the wholeloan marketplace as derived from the Monte
Carlo simulation exercise detailed in Section 4, where the total lending amount
under the simulation is constrained to equal the observed total lending in the
wholeloan marketplace (£85.66m). To distinguish between the sample and
efficient institutional investor lending, note that in the former sample case the
VaR estimates are calculated based on the actual loans chosen by the institu-
tional investors in the sample, i.e. for each simulation, the portfolio is formed
from the 1489 loans that the institutional investors actually backed. In the latter
efficient case, for each simulation, the portfolio is formed by selecting from the
full pool of wholeloans, i.e. the same 1489 loans plus the 356 loans that were
originally recycled by institutional investors. Panel B presents the results of the
randomised loan allocation experiment detailed in Section 4. The randomised
loan allocation procedure works by randomly redefining each loan in the
sample as being either a wholeloan or partloan. This generates a set of simu-
lated wholeloans that differ from the set of observed wholeloans. Lending ef-
ficiency can then be determined by comparing the value-at-risk exposure for a
simulated sample derived from a process of random loan rejection in proportion
to the observed rejection rate in the observed sample data and an efficient
sample derived by following a default risk based decision rule consistent with
the implied δ-threshold of 27% reported for the wholeloan marketplace. This
procedure is repeated for a large set of simulations (1000 simulation runs of
1000 simulations each). The reported figures are averages across the simula-
tions. Monetary amounts are in units of one million pounds.
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Furthermore, no identifiable difference in interest rates is observed
between wholeloans approved by institutional investors and partloans
approved by large-sized retail investor groups, which contrasts with the
statistically significant and lower interest rates on loans financed by
small- and medium-sized groups (0.80% and 0.34% lower respectively,
Table IX). A similar finding emerges in relation to realised returns on
repaid loans, where small- and medium-sized retail investor groups
underperform both large-sized retail investor groups and institutional
investors (by 0.92% and 0.41% respectively; Table IX). Furthermore,
while our main findings suggest that institutional investors lose more
on defaulted wholeloans than retail investors lose on defaulted
partloans, we find no statistically significant difference (Table IX; ex-
tended model) in the losses incurred by institutional investors and
large- and medium-sized retail investor groups.
The results provide a more nuanced interpretation of our main
conclusion that institutional investors outperform retail investors. We
find that this is generally true only for small- and medium-sized retail
investor groups, with comparable performance, in fact, being evidenced
in the lending decisions of institutional investors and large-sized retail
investor groups. This is an important new observation about institu-
tional investment in peer-to-business lending.
6. Platform change from auction to fixed rate system
We reported earlier that institutional investors fund loans at ex-ante
higher interest rates without facing higher ex-post default risk. It is
necessary to consider this finding in the context of an important change
to the lending platform that occurred during the sample period. On the
28th September 2015, the mechanism through which interest rates are
set on loans was changed from an auction-based system to one of fixed
interest rates set by the platform. The Funding Circle auction process
allowed for competitive bidding, where an investor bid the gross in-
terest rate required and, at that level of interest rate, the amount of
funds willing to be advanced. A business had a degree of flexibility in
the process in that it could accept a business loan early, before the
auction ended, once 100% of the funding was secured.
The purpose of the move to a fixed rate system was to address in-
herent flaws with the auctioning system as identified by the lending
platform, including cash drag for investors, loan rate uncertainty for
borrowers, and the overall complexity of the auction process for its
users. In setting fixed interest rates, the lending platform employs its
own credit assessment process and sets out a schedule of fixed interest
rates across risk band and loan term; property-related loans are dealt
with on a case-by-case basis.4 Fixed interest rates are set based on a
number of inputs including macroeconomic trends, expected loss rates,
volatility of returns, and comparisons with the wider market for pricing
business loans. Similar transitioning away from the auction model has
occurred in other marketplaces. For example, Prosper.com moved to a
fixed rate system in December 2010. Wei and Lin (2016) study this
change of regime and find that the advantages of doing so include a
faster deployment of funds and increased interest rates for lenders, al-
though loans are found to have a higher likelihood of defaulting.
The loss of autonomy over the setting of interest rates has con-
siderable implications for institutions. The theory on interest rate set-
ting behaviour suggests that various factors influence the setting of
interest rates by institutions. Macro economy-level factors include GDP,
inflation, the level and volatility of market interest rates, monetary
policy (interest rate channel) and industry structure (competition),
while micro firm-level factors include institutional characteristics (size,
liquidity, capitalisation, deposit strength, long-term business), maturity
mismatch between assets and liabilities, the cost of intermediation and
the riskiness of credit portfolios held (Gambacorta, 2008). Demirgüç-
Kunt and Huizinga (1999) likewise examine interest margins and show
evidence of the role of macroeconomic indicators, the characteristics of
the taxation system, the financial structure and institutional char-
acteristics in the setting of interest rates by institutions. Kitamura,
Muto, and Takei (2015) summarise the literature on interest pass-
through as commonly reporting that high proportions of relationship
lending lead to lower interest rates, while capital buffers or liquidity
buffers also lead to lower interest rates. This is confirmed by
Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2014) in the post financial crisis period.
Kitamura et al. (2015) also argue that the balance sheets of borrowing
firms are an important driver of interest rates, while Weth (2002)
suggests similar in respect of firms' risk characteristics.
The above literature suggests a complex system within which in-
stitutions set interest rates, while it is notable in the online lending
market setting that institutions cannot work to a relationship lending
model and usually have much more limited information on prospective
borrowers. Therefore, this provides an important context to the struc-
tural change in the interest rate regime underlying the Funding Circle
platform. Given this move from lenders as interest rate setters to
Table VIII
Probability of loan default: Size-based retail investor groups.
Base model Ext. model
Coeff Marginal effects Coeff Marginal effects
Term 0.0197*** 0.0042*** 0.0191*** 0.0039***
(0.0016) (0.0003) (0.0018) (0.0004)
log Age −0.1153*** −0.0245*** −0.1996*** −0.0410***
(0.0385) (0.0082) (0.0428) (0.0087)
log LoanAmt −0.0157 −0.0033 0.0281 0.0058
(0.0427) (0.0091) (0.0463) (0.0095)
IntRate 0.1043*** 0.0222*** 0.1218*** 0.0250***
(0.0367) (0.0078) (0.0378) (0.0078)
Low_parts 0.1659* 0.0353* 0.2285** 0.0469**
(0.0848) (0.0180) (0.0899) (0.0184)
Medium_parts 0.1427* 0.0304* 0.1471* 0.0302*
(0.0758) (0.0161) (0.0813) (0.0167)
High_parts 0.0404 0.0086 0.0795 0.0163
(0.0855) (0.0182) (0.0905) (0.0186)
Recycled 0.0778 0.0166 0.0319 0.0066
(0.0860) (0.0183) (0.0881) (0.0181)
CrBandA 0.3219*** 0.0685*** 0.2557** 0.0525**
(0.1005) (0.0214) (0.1058) (0.0217)
CrBandB 0.3080** 0.0655** 0.1933 0.0397
(0.1226) (0.0261) (0.1280) (0.0263)
CrBandC 0.3798** 0.0808** 0.2565 0.0527
(0.1545) (0.0329) (0.1614) (0.0331)
CrBandD 0.1844 0.0392 0.0273 0.0056
(0.2142) (0.0456) (0.2225) (0.0457)
CrBandE −0.1488 −0.0316 −0.3506 −0.0720







Observations 3791 3791 3791 3791
LR chi2 356.98 472.98
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.1089 0.1442
Table reports the results of the probit regression model of loan default prob-
ability with the retail market investor base stratified by group size. The base
model, as discussed in Section 5, includes Low_Parts,Med_Parts and High_Parts as
dummy variables that identify respectively partloans funded by small-,
medium- and large-sized retail investor groups respectively. Wholeloan, re-
presenting loans funded by institutional investors in the wholesale marketplace,
is omitted and used as the reference case. All variables are defined in Table I,
along with the base cases for the dummy variable categories used. The extended
model includes region, sector and purpose fixed effects. Coeff. denotes regres-
sion coefficient. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
4 The current schedule of fixed interest rates (as of September 2019) is
available at https://www.fundingcircle.com/uk/fixedrate/.
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interest rate takers, it is pertinent and prudent to test the average dif-
ference in loan rate changes vis-à-vis institutional loans in the whole-
sale marketplace and retail loans in the retail marketplace. To this end,
we perform separate loan rate regressions on the auction period (pre-
28th September 2015) and the fixed rate period (post-27th September
2015), and then conduct formal model comparison tests thereafter.
Mohammadi and Shafi (2017), in their study of the same platform, use a
difference-in-difference method to show that interest rates generally
increased by 31 basis points on average for all lenders with this tran-
sition to fixed interest rates. This corroborates the finding of Wei and
Lin (2016) that interests increase to the advantage (disadvantage) of
lenders (borrowers) with the transition to fixed rates. Our analysis
differs and provides insights into the differential effects of this transi-
tion on institutional and retail investors. For completeness, we first
consider retail investors as a single collective (as in Section 3), and
subsequently stratify by retail investor group size categories (as in
Section 5). Results are reported in Table X. Note that as property related
loans have always worked off a fixed rate system, we exclude this type
of loan from our analysis. Descriptive statistics for the loan observations
across both periods are presented in Table F.I of Appendix F (online).
Considering retail investors as a single collective first, we find that
during the auction period institutional investors achieve an interest rate
which is 0.51% higher than retail investors. In the fixed rate period,
however, this completely disappears. This indicates that institutional
investors were better placed relative to retail investors when setting
interest rates via the auction process. When we stratify by retail
investor group size, we again find superior performance on the part of
institutional investors relative to small- and medium-sized retail in-
vestor groups in the auction period, with such loans achieving 0.92%
and 0.40%, respectively, below the average loan rates approved by
institutional investors, with no significant difference relative to large-
sized retail investor groups. This contrasts with the fixed rate period,
where we find that interest rates on institutionally-financed wholeloans
are indistinguishable from partloans financed by any of the retail in-
vestor groups. When we do a similar analysis on the probability of
default probit model, we find again that for the fixed rate period there is
no difference in the likelihood of default between loans financed by
institutional investors and loans financed by retail investor groups of
any size (Table XI), while in the auction period loans financed by small-
and medium-sized retail investor groups have a higher probability of
default relative to wholeloans financed by institutional investors.
When we couple the loan rate and default probability results above,
we conclude that the ability of institutional investors to generally
screen loans better than retail investors is an observation confined to
the auction period.
To complete our assessment of the change to the fixed rate system,
we conduct similar analysis this time on realised returns. Results for the
realised returns on defaulted and repaid loans are presented in Tables
XII and XIII respectively. It is interesting to note that during the auction
period, institutional investors consistently lost more upon default
(Table XII), while achieving higher returns on the upside (Table XIII),
although this latter observation is true only for the small- and medium-
Table IX
Loan rate and realised returns analysis: Size-based retail investor groups.






Base model Ext. model Base model Ext. model Base model Ext. model
Term 0.0091*** 0.0098*** −0.7212*** −0.5716*** 0.0097*** 0.0105***
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.1149) (0.1090) (0.0008) (0.0009)
log Age −0.0811*** −0.0468*** 7.4343*** 6.5748*** −0.0767*** −0.0373*
(0.0163) (0.0172) (2.3170) (2.2371) (0.0182) (0.0193)
log LoanAmt 0.0647*** 0.0377** −0.7617 1.1097 0.0677*** 0.0377*
(0.0162) (0.0171) (3.0293) (2.7097) (0.0185) (0.0196)
Low_parts −0.7998*** −0.8296*** 17.6040*** 10.8026*** −0.9159*** −0.9521***
(0.0356) (0.0363) (4.6108) (4.0147) (0.0410) (0.0422)
Medium_parts −0.3408*** −0.3661*** 12.5837*** 0.2457 −0.4036*** −0.4290***
(0.0382) (0.0381) (3.6884) (3.3709) (0.0458) (0.0458)
High_parts 0.0111 −0.0322 15.9229*** 2.1555 0.0106 −0.0410
(0.0377) (0.0391) (4.4603) (4.2242) (0.0442) (0.0463)
Recycled 0.3090*** 0.3215*** −6.3062* −7.8371** 0.3107*** 0.3292***
(0.0494) (0.0491) (3.7017) (3.6617) (0.0610) (0.0607)
CrBandA 1.3535*** 1.3913*** 4.1278 0.5636 1.4316*** 1.4716***
(0.0343) (0.0371) (5.5556) (5.5107) (0.0385) (0.0419)
CrBandB 2.3479*** 2.3840*** 6.2561 −1.6880 2.5265*** 2.5672***
(0.0360) (0.0387) (5.3968) (5.3271) (0.0409) (0.0441)
CrBandC 3.4316*** 3.4788*** 7.5013 −1.9970 3.6874*** 3.7365***
(0.0375) (0.0406) (5.6756) (5.5496) (0.0448) (0.0479)
CrBandD 5.1533*** 5.2083*** 6.2910 −0.6138 5.5963*** 5.6561***
(0.0440) (0.0463) (6.2304) (5.8292) (0.0522) (0.0547)
CrBandE 10.0016*** 10.0626*** −13.4847 0.0456 11.2100*** 11.2485***
(0.0668) (0.0700) (9.2474) (9.1736) (0.0939) (0.0970)
Constant 7.1222*** 7.6100*** −53.1629* −21.3326 6.3074*** 6.8715***
(0.1732) (0.2330) (30.6468) (30.7939) (0.1978) (0.2693)
Region Yes Yes Yes
Sector Yes Yes Yes
Purpose Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3791 3791 590 590 3201 3201
Adj. R2 0.8701 0.8742 0.1454 0.3346 0.8670 0.8716
F 3083.10 930.12 7.60 9.30 2246.58 691.66
Table reports the results of the loan rate and realised returns regression models with the retail market investor base stratified by group size. The base model, as
discussed in Section 5, includes Low_Parts, Med_Parts and High_Parts as dummy variables that identify respectively partloans funded by small-, medium- and large-
sized retail investor groups respectively. Wholeloan, representing loans funded by institutional investors, is omitted and used as the reference case. All variables are
defined in Table I, along with the base cases for the dummy variable categories used. The extended model includes time, region, sector and purpose fixed effects.
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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sized retail investor groups. With the move to the fixed rate system, the
upside advantage is no longer evidenced, while there is also no statis-
tical difference in default losses between the two investor cohorts
during the fixed rate period. As with the loan screening ability, we find
that loan payoffs are only better (worse) for institutional investors on
repaid (defaulted) loans during the auction period.
7. Conclusion
Our study contributes to our knowledge of the lending decisions of
institutional investors operating in online business lending markets, and
to the emerging discourse on institutional involvement in online credit
extension more generally. We account for two channels of institutional
investment in the online business lending market we examine; namely,
the wholesale marketplace dedicated to institutional investors and the
retail marketplace dominated by retail investors. We find that institu-
tional investors perform better than retail investors in screening loan
applications, evidenced through charging higher ex-ante loan rates
without assuming higher ex-post default risk. We additionally find that
institutional investors earn higher returns on repaid loans than retail
investors. However, we find no evidence that the lending decisions of
institutional investors are consistent with an objective of default risk
minimisation, raising questions over the ability of institutional in-
vestors to process borrower information and alleviate information
asymmetries. We leverage this observation to quantify the level of
lending efficiency in the wholesale marketplace.
Extending our main findings, we firstly show that a more nuanced
consideration of the retail investor base is required. We provide evi-
dence of the influence of group size in assessing loan applications. We
find that institutional investors outperform small- and medium-sized
Table X
Loan rate analysis: change over from auction to fixed rate system.
Base model (retail group
collective)






Auction period Fixed rate
period
Term 0.0064*** 0.0207*** 0.0063*** 0.0207***
(0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0012)
log Age −0.0379* −0.0557* −0.0381* −0.0559*
(0.0229) (0.0314) (0.0218) (0.0315)
log LoanAmt 0.2950*** 0.0298 0.0592*** 0.0190
(0.0188) (0.0300) (0.0199) (0.0307)
Wholeloan 0.5089*** 0.0256 −0.9190*** −0.0487







Recycled 0.3907*** −0.0353 0.4000*** −0.0395
(0.0565) (0.0513) (0.0550) (0.0519)
CrBandA 1.2410*** 1.6648*** 1.2353*** 1.6668***
(0.0491) (0.0503) (0.0461) (0.0500)
CrBandB 2.2583*** 2.6526*** 2.2666*** 2.6520***
(0.0502) (0.0445) (0.0475) (0.0446)
CrBandC 3.3294*** 3.9963*** 3.3242*** 3.9951***
(0.0510) (0.0528) (0.0477) (0.0530)
CrBandD 4.9828*** 6.1572*** 4.9660*** 6.1583***
(0.0542) (0.0475) (0.0517) (0.0478)
CrBandE 10.3639*** 10.1226*** 10.1512*** 10.1132***
(0.1039) (0.0493) (0.1073) (0.0515)
Constant 4.3024*** 6.6301*** 7.3049*** 6.7682***
(0.2021) (0.2473) (0.2056) (0.2780)
# Obs. 2758 734 2758 734
Adj R2 0.8186 0.9678 0.8325 0.9679






Table reports the results of the loan rate regression analysis around the change
in the Funding Circle platform from an auction-based system of setting interest
rates (‘Auction period’) to a fixed rate system (‘Fixed rate period’). The date of
the system change is the 28th September 2015. Wholeloan represents loans
funded by institutional investors. Low_Parts, Med_Parts and High_Parts are
dummy variables that identify respectively partloans funded by small-,
medium- and large-sized retail investor groups. All variables are defined in
Table I, along with the base cases for the dummy variable categories used. The
equality of regression coefficients test follows the approach of Clogg et al.
(1995), with statistical significance of the z-score indicating a difference in the
regression coefficient between the two sample periods. Standard errors are in
parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels respectively. Property related loans are excluded on the basis that this
loan type worked to a fixed rate system during the auction period.
Table XI
Probability of loan default: change over from auction to fixed rate system.
Base model (retail group
collective)
Base model (retail group size
categories)






Term 0.0205*** 0.0083** 0.0205*** 0.0084**
(0.0017) (0.0036) (0.0017) (0.0036)
log Age −0.1700*** −0.1981** −0.1691*** −0.2017**
(0.0459) (0.0941) (0.0459) (0.0937)
log LoanAmt −0.0251 0.0697 0.0011 0.0961
(0.0387) (0.0618) (0.0482) (0.0746)
IntRate 0.1158*** 0.1209 0.1219*** 0.1247









Recycled 0.0275 0.2217 0.0217 0.2269
(0.0933) (0.2444) (0.0936) (0.2441)
CrBandA 0.2411** 0.2342 0.2322* 0.2239
(0.1197) (0.2483) (0.1206) (0.2461)
CrBandB 0.2394* 0.0379 0.2227 0.0315
(0.1376) (0.3617) (0.1406) (0.3569)
CrBandC 0.2714* 0.1802 0.2507 0.1620
(0.1637) (0.5287) (0.1676) (0.5180)
CrBandD 0.0353 0.0635 0.0048 0.0478
(0.2206) (0.7757) (0.2267) (0.7595)
CrBandE −0.2877 −0.5352 −0.3266 −0.5535
(0.4862) (1.2543) (0.4914) (1.2274)
Constant −2.5041*** −2.9627*** −2.9975*** −3.3881***
(0.4242) (1.0311) (0.5767) (1.0444)
# Obs. 2762 734 2762 734
LR chi2 243.33 54.06 244.66 56.72
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.0937 0.0778 0.0940 0.0791
Table reports the results of the probit regression model of loan default prob-
ability around the change in the Funding Circle platform from an auction-based
system of setting interest rates (‘Auction period’) to a fixed rate system (‘Fixed
rate period’). The date of the system change is the 28th September 2015.
Wholeloan represents loans funded by institutional investors. Low_Parts,
Med_Parts and High_Parts are dummy variables that identify respectively
partloans funded by small-, medium- and large-sized retail investor groups. All
variables are defined in Table I, along with the base cases for the dummy
variable categories used. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Property
related loans are excluded on the basis that this loan type worked to a fixed rate
system during the auction period.
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retail investor groups in lending performance, but find no discernible
difference in performance against large-sized retail investor groups.
This raises further questions over the ability of institutional investors to
manage information asymmetries in this setting. We then proceed to
establish that the auction process is critical to successful outcomes in
the lending decisions of institutional investors. Indeed, we show that
the superior performance relative to retail investors appears to be
confined to the auction period.
Our knowledge of institutional investment in online business
lending markets lags well behind our knowledge of institutional in-
vestment through venture capital and private equity channels. There
are a couple of useful directions of future research. Firstly, our evidence
raises questions as to how and why financial institutions engage with
online lending markets. An interesting direction for future research
would be to explore the motivation for institutional participation in
such lending activity. Part of this motivation may be diversification in a
wider investment portfolio context and so a joint analysis of conven-
tional and alternative lending activities on the part of institutional in-
vestors would be welcome. Secondly, a limitation of the lending effi-
ciency analysis we conduct is that it concentrates on the question of
default risk minimisation. The question of risk-return trade-off is per-
haps more pertinent. Such an analysis of Markowitz mean-variance
efficiency in online business lending markets would provide useful in-
sights. Indeed, we have seen a move among peer-to-peer lending plat-
forms of removing autonomy from retail investors and investing instead
Table XII
Realised return analysis (defaulted loans): change over from auction to fixed
rate system.
Base model (retail group
collective)
Base model (retail group size
categories)
Auction period Fixed rate
period
Auction period Fixed rate
period
Term −0.7985*** −0.4063* −0.7984*** −0.4311*
(0.1334) (0.2253) (0.1350) (0.2280)
log Age 8.5759*** 2.4893 8.3072*** 3.2865
(2.5073) (5.6327) (2.5357) (5.5934)
log LoanAmt −2.7146 0.9794 −3.8820 2.1962









Recycled −8.4477** 2.3525 −8.0244** 2.5016
(3.9146) (8.0417) (3.8713) (8.1350)
CrBandA 3.7255 2.5698 4.3663 1.8548
(6.3319) (10.0999) (6.3559) (10.7515)
CrBandB 6.0135 −10.3221 6.5625 −10.5446
(6.2875) (7.5816) (6.4090) (7.6930)
CrBandC 5.8480 −7.9650 6.4770 −8.1167
(6.6457) (8.7647) (6.7880) (8.9595)
CrBandD 6.4444 −10.4296 7.1853 −10.8494
(7.3222) (8.1633) (7.5293) (8.4931)
CrBandE −22.4315*** −1.2943 −22.4319*** −0.7284
(7.8848) (13.8142) (8.3455) (13.5423)
Constant −11.3341 −81.5201** −12.1570 −93.2068**
(25.2480) (38.8228) (38.4118) (46.9802)
# Obs. 475 115 475 115
Adj R2 0.1508 0.1001 0.1571 0.1071






Table reports the results of the realised return regression analysis on defaulted
loans around the change in the Funding Circle platform from an auction-based
system of setting interest rates (‘Auction period’) to a fixed rate system (‘Fixed
rate period’). The date of the system change is the 28th September 2015.
Wholeloan represents loans funded by institutional investors. Low_Parts,
Med_Parts and High_Parts are dummy variables that identify respectively
partloans funded by small-, medium- and large-sized retail investor groups. All
variables are defined in Table I, along with the base cases for the dummy
variable categories used. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Note that no
property related loans defaulted in either period.
Table XIII
Realised return analysis (repaid loans): change over from auction to fixed rate
system.
Base model (crowd) Base model (crowd size
categories)
Auction period Fixed rate
period
Auction period Fixed rate
period
Term 0.0067*** 0.0227*** 0.0064*** 0.0228***
(0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0013)
log Age −0.0155 −0.0763* −0.0189 −0.0752*
(0.0248) (0.0396) (0.0237) (0.0391)
log LoanAmt 0.3102*** 0.0418 0.0573*** 0.0347









Recycled 0.3918*** −0.0563 0.4077*** −0.0598
(0.0698) (0.0683) (0.0676) (0.0684)
CrBandA 1.2978*** 1.8078*** 1.2943*** 1.8091***
(0.0546) (0.0574) (0.0511) (0.0571)
CrBandB 2.4146*** 2.8787*** 2.4381*** 2.8781***
(0.0569) (0.0506) (0.0536) (0.0509)
CrBandC 3.5480*** 4.3755*** 3.5596*** 4.3735***
(0.0591) (0.0668) (0.0552) (0.0670)
CrBand_D 5.4047*** 6.7628*** 5.3951*** 6.7638***
(0.0628) (0.0550) (0.0589) (0.0559)
CrBandE 11.5648*** 11.2941*** 11.3719*** 11.2870***
(0.1477) (0.0572) (0.1683) (0.0597)
Constant 3.2665*** 5.6744*** 6.5489*** 5.7512***
(0.2298) (0.2927) (0.2295) (0.3258)
# Obs. 2287 619 2287 619
Adj. R2 0.8179 0.9637 0.8337 0.9638






Table reports the results of the realised return regression analysis for repaid
loans around the change in the Funding Circle platform from an auction-based
system of setting interest rates (‘Auction period’) to a fixed rate system (‘Fixed
rate period’). The date of the system change is the 28th September 2015.
Wholeloan represents loans funded by institutional investors. Low_Parts,
Med_Parts and High_Parts are dummy variables that identify respectively
partloans funded by small-, medium- and large-sized retail investor groups. All
variables are defined in Table I, along with the base cases for the dummy
variable categories used. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Property
related loans are excluded on the basis that this loan type worked to a fixed rate
system during the auction period.
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on behalf of investors in diversified portfolios of loans. This is seen as a
way to mitigate risk for lenders, particularly inexperienced lenders,
thereby bettering their experience of and retaining their engagement
with the lending platforms. As an example, Funding Circle, announced
in 2017 an important change to its platform offering. Retail investors
must now invest in one of two portfolios: a ‘balanced’ portfolio that
lends to businesses across the full range of credit bands, offering higher
project return for higher bad debt exposure; and a ‘conservative’ port-
folio for that lands to business in the upper credit bands, with a lower
project return for a lower bad debt exposure. Understanding this new
market mechanism is a natural next step to our work.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2020.101542.
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